



The experiences of refugees—their “voices” and memories—
have routinely been excluded from the historical record. 
With rare exceptions, refugees are absent from mainstream 
history: although specific episodes of forced migration may 
be carefully recorded and even celebrated in national 
histories, most refugee movements are ignored and their 
participants silenced. This article examines the practice of 
exclusion and its implications for historical research and 
for the study of forced migration. It considers experiences 
of refugees from the early modern era until the twenty-first 
century, mobilizing examples from Europe, the Americas, 
and South Asia, and offering comparative observations. It 
examines relationships between forced migrants and insti-
tutions of the nation-state, and the meanings of exclusion 
within ideologies of national belonging. It considers remed-
ial measures and their implications for current efforts to 
ensure refugee voices are heard and understood.
Résumé
Les expériences des réfugiés—leurs « voix » et leurs souve-
nirs—ont été exclues de façon systématique des chroniques 
et témoignages historiques. Sauf quelques rares exceptions, 
les réfugiés sont absents de l’histoire conventionnelle. Bien 
que des instances spécifiques de migrations forcées soient 
soigneusement documentées et même commémorées 
dans le cadre des histoires nationales, la majorité des 
mouvements de réfugiés sont ignorés et leurs participants 
sont réduits au silence. Cet article examine la pratique 
de l’exclusion et ses implications pour la recherche his-
torique, ainsi que pour l’étude de la migration forcée. Il 
considère les expériences des réfugiés depuis les débuts 
de l’ère moderne jusqu’au XXIe siècle, en rassemblant des 
cas provenant de l’Europe, des Amériques et de l’Asie du 
Sud, et offrant des observations comparatives. Il se penche 
sur les liens entre les migrants forcés et les institutions de 
l’état-nation, ainsi que sur la signification de l’exclusion 
dans le contexte des idéologies d’appartenance nationale. 
Il étudie des mesures de réparation et leurs implications 
pour les initiatives actuelles visant à garantir que les voix 
des réfugiés sont entendues et comprises.
“Collective Amnesia”
For centuries refugees have been associated with pro-cesses of enormous importance to the modern world order. Their experiences have rarely been of interest 
to archivists and professional historians, however, with the 
result that refugee voices are largely absent from mainstream 
history. What explains this striking deficit—and what meas-
ures might be taken to enable a different approach?
Emergence of the nation-state in the early modern era 
was closely associated with major episodes of forced migra-
tion in Europe. The term réfugié was coined during this 
period, and refugees, often referred to as “exiles,” were 
widely dispersed across the new states.1 As the nation-state 
became the dominant form of socio-political organization 
worldwide, forced migration became more general: by the 
twentieth century, refugee movements were on such a scale 
that influential states collaborated to produce the first for-
mal measures to recognize and manage mass displacement.2 
The refugee experience was nonetheless seldom viewed as a 
matter of intrinsic interest, and refugees were largely absent 
from the historical record. Tony Kushner and Katherine 
Knox describe a “general silence on refugee questions in 
the discipline [history].”3 They continue, “If their [refugees’] 
presence is one of ‘the hallmarks of our time,’ then modern 
and contemporary historians have hardly noticed it.”4
The practice of exclusion has been evident, even in rela-
tion to major episodes of forced migration. For example, in 
1914 some 250,000 Belgian refugees arrived in Britain, fleeing 
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German military offensives at the start of the First World 
War. Their migration involved the largest refugee movement 
in British history, but for almost a century it was “forgotten.” 
Historians did not recognize the Belgians’ arrival, their 
experiences in Britain, or their hasty departure at the end of 
the war—an expression of what Tony Kushner calls “collect-
ive amnesia” in relation to the refugees5—and it was almost 
one hundred years before researchers stimulated by grow-
ing attention in Britain to family and community history 
began systematic work on the 1914 migrations.6 Records of 
the Great War, part of the dominant narrative of British his-
tory in the twentieth century, silenced the refugees: neither 
their experiences nor those of millions of people with whom 
they came into contact had been judged worthy of interest 
by professional historians.
The Belgian migrations of 1914 were striking in many 
ways, including the very large numbers involved, the abrupt 
arrivals, the enthusiastic public reception, and the hesitant 
and contradictory responses of government. They mark an 
important episode—one ignored by professional histor-
ians until addressed by Peter Cahalan in Belgian Refugee 
Relief in England during the Great War, published in 1982.7 
Reviewing refugee movements in Britain during the twen-
tieth century, Kushner and Knox comment that, given the 
importance of the Belgian migrations, it is significant that 
Cahalan’s book remained for decades the only major study 
of the movement.8 When Pierre Purseigle examined the 
events again, twenty years after Cahalan’s landmark pub-
lication, he observed, “The experiences of the four million 
people who fled their homes before the [German] invasion 
have been surprisingly neglected, as if historiography and 
collective memory alike concurred in marginalising the 
Western Front refugees.”9
Many major episodes of mass displacement have simi-
larly “disappeared” from official history—from accounts 
that constitute what the Indian historian Gyanendra 
Pandey calls “national memory.”10 Until the emergence of 
the school of world history in 1970s, scholarly research in 
Europe and North America was shaped almost exclusively 
by national concerns.11 Methodological nationalism con-
fined perspectives on the past: the nation-state framework 
and the agendas of those in authority in the state (or those 
who wished for such authority) constituted what Wimmer 
and Glick Schiller call an “iron cage,” confining and limit-
ing historical analysis.12 History as an account of the past 
framed in national terms largely excluded outsiders, espe-
cially those who arrived as part of abrupt or unexpected 
population movements. Since emergence of the nation-
state in the early modern era, control of state borders and 
of population movements had been key issues for those 
holding authority in institutions of government. People 
attempting to cross borders in unplanned movements were 
often viewed as a threat to territorial and socio-cultural 
integrity. With certain important exceptions, their admis-
sion was inhibited; they were often detained, deported, or 
repatriated. Exclusion was sometimes publicized widely in 
efforts to assert governmental authority, but as a rule those 
rejected or expelled were “forgotten”—victims of a general 
amnesia about refugees.13
Silences of Partition
This pattern continued down the centuries. Partition of the 
colonial state of India, enacted formally in 1947, produced 
a series of complex mass displacements. For almost forty 
years, however, a fictional work, Kushwant Singh’s Train 
to Pakistan, was the only focused attempt to address the 
experiences of those affected.14 Singh had been a witness 
to migrations in which millions of people were compelled 
to undertake dangerous journeys to uncertain destina-
tions. Many were affected by extreme violence as two new 
independent states, India and Pakistan, were established 
amid intense ethno-religious conflict. Opening his novel, 
published in 1956, Singh wrote, “Muslims said the Hindus 
had planned and started the killing. According to the Hin-
dus, the Muslims were to blame. The fact is, both sides killed. 
Both shot and stabbed and speared and clubbed. Both tor-
tured. Both raped … all of northern India was in arms, in 
terror or in hiding.”15
The experiential aspect of these events was, however, “for-
gotten” by historians, politicians, and mass media. While 
mainstream accounts focused on political figures and “deci-
sions made far away,”16 millions of people directly affected, 
observes Tarun Saint, remained “neglected aspects of this 
catastrophe.”17 Decades passed after publication of Train to 
Pakistan before the first systematic research into the clashes of 
1947 and their long-term consequences.18 Saint observes that 
this required a radical reorientation among historians in rela-
tion to Partition—a “reconfiguring” of the historical archive.19
Mainstream history in India, says Urvashi Butalia, 
assumed that Partition was “over, done with, a thing of the 
past.”20 In the late 1980s feminist historians began to investi-
gate experiences of those affected by communal conflict and 
mass displacement, revealing that Partition had been less a 
specific episode than a continuous experience over decades 
of separation and exclusion, sometimes of intimidation and 
further violence—what Vazira Zamindar calls “the long 
Partition.”21 Challenging the dominant historical narrative, 
Butalia suggests that “all around us was a different reality: 
partitions everywhere, communal tension, religious funda-
mentalism, continuing divisions on the basis of religion.”22
In order to understand both the displacements of 1947 
and their outcomes, it is necessary to focus upon those 
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affected, Butalia suggests. This requires attention to the 
past as a lived experience and as experience recalled—for 
“memories, individual and collective, familial and historical, 
are what make up the reality of Partition.”23 According to 
this view, mass displacement and the making of refugees 
have a profound, long-term impact on individual lives and 
on the wider society. In the case of Partition, displacement 
should be viewed less as a series of events than as a process 
associated with powerful socio-political forces that both 
maintained structures of exclusion and sought to deny their 
purpose and effect. “Official” history often sanitizes such 
processes, ignoring the testimony of those who might ques-
tion the dominant account and who might challenge the 
practices of the state today. Here is an indication as to the 
significance of historians’ silence on refugees’ experiences, 
for the latter can challenge and even subvert both official 
accounts and contemporary attitudes that rest upon them. 
To understand Partition then and now, Butalia concludes, 
official records must be questioned by “turning the his-
torical lens to a somewhat different angle.”24 This requires 
attention to oral narrative: a willingness to hear testimony 
and to engage with memory.
Nations, Denial, and “Forgetting”
Foundational events in the histories of nation-states are 
often associated with mass movements of people affected by 
inclusion/exclusion in relation to both cultural boundaries 
and physical territories of the state. This is examined in the 
Indian context in Kushwant Singh’s Train to Pakistan. Here 
a small rural community, Mano Majra, is home to Sikhs, 
Hindus, Muslims, and Christians. Notwithstanding their 
differences, each has engaged with the others and each ven-
erates the local deity, a rock that stands in the centre of the 
village. Mano Majra is connected to cities east and west by 
the railway, and in the summer of 1947 “ghost trains” begin 
to arrive in the village loaded with the corpses of people from 
afar. They bring communal conflicts that dwarf the minor 
disputes of village life, and many people leave in fear. As the 
local death toll mounts, more trains arrive. A mass grave 
is dug, bodies are buried, and the pit is closed: “The place 
looked like the scar of a healed-up wound,” writes Singh, but 
“nobody wanted to know who the dead people were.”25
Singh’s words were prophetic. In the new Indian state 
there was little space for critical reflection on experiences 
of those present at its birth or on the implications for con-
temporary society. For decades “national memory” depicted 
Partition as a series of discrete events in which new borders 
emerged and new institutions were established; the sear-
ing violence of 1947 and its long-term impact on countless 
communities was officially “forgotten.” Ideologues of the 
new India, says Pandey, together with “the long arm of the 
publishing houses and modern media and the homogeni-
sation of culture” produced and disseminated a particular 
memory—that centred on the state itself and its agenda for 
national integration and development.26 Denial and forget-
ting have long been integral to histories of the nation-state. 
Almost without exception, modern states have been born 
in violent circumstances—wars, military occupations, civil 
conflicts, revolutions, and campaigns of exclusion that aim 
to discipline volatile populations and/or to secure forms of 
ethno-religious homogeneity, facilitating new ideologies of 
national belonging. For Ernest Renan, writing in the 1880s, 
“Forgetting, I would even go so far as to say historical error, 
is a crucial factor in the creation of a nation, which is why 
progress in historical studies often constitutes a danger for 
[the principle of] nationality. Indeed, historical enquiry 
brings to light deeds of violence which took place at the 
origin of all political formations, even of those whose con-
sequences have been altogether beneficial. Unity is always 
effected by means of brutality.”27
For Renan, a partisan of liberal nationalism, even “bene-
ficial” outcomes were intimately associated with experiences 
of violence later discarded from memories of nation. This 
involved “error”—the omission of key historic episodes 
that in the case of France included massacres of those who 
resisted subordination to central authority.28 Although 
reflections on the past never embrace the presence of all 
historic actors (history is famously written “by the victors”), 
Renan’s observations highlight how narratives of nation may 
exclude entire communities, ethno-religious groups, and 
regional populations. In the early modern era, absolutist 
states in Europe organized repeated mass expulsions, first 
in Spain and then in Portugal, in which centralizing mon-
archies removed large numbers of Jews and Muslims whose 
religious affiliation they deemed incompatible with the Cath-
olicism of the Crown. The practice was repeated in France, 
where the state-building project was closely associated with 
imposition of religious orthodoxy, resulting in displace-
ment of many members of the Protestant minority. By the 
nineteenth century, as “nationalization” swept Europe from 
west to east, construction of nation-states proper involved 
displacement of many ethno-religious and linguistic groups. 
This increasingly took the form of campaigns of exclusion in 
which removal of a target population was enforced by armies, 
militias, and officials of the state or putative state, after which 
return of those displaced was prevented on the basis that 
their “race,” religion, language, or traditions were incompat-
ible with those of national society. Philipp Ther comments 
on the importance for socio-political arrangements across 
the continent, asserting, “Ethnic cleansing is a product of the 
nation-state and hence one of the basic components of Eur-
ope” (emphasis added).29 Related forms of displacement by 
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states, proto-states, and national movements have included 
deportation, “transfer,” resettlement, “repatriation,” and—in 
the case of the most focused campaigns—genocide.30 At the 
same time, colonial powers deported certain groups (includ-
ing religious dissenters, political radicals, and petty crimin-
als) to their overseas territories, so that colonial settlement 
was linked to consolidating national identity in the domes-
tic context. Mass displacement was integral to the making 
of the modern state-centred order and to this extent forced 
migrants were part of that order, necessary to its develop-
ment and consolidation.
As mass displacement in and from Europe gathered pace, 
those affected experienced a common difficulty—that of their 
vulnerability vis-à-vis those in authority in the new states. 
Forced migrants had long been disadvantaged in relation 
to central authorities, principally imperial powers, religious 
institutions, and local power-holders. The state-making pro-
cess intensified these problems. It stimulated mass displace-
ment and directed attention to new borders, greatly increas-
ing the vulnerability of those in flight. As Soguk makes 
clear in the case of France, the centralizing state mapped 
domestic territory much more precisely than before, intro-
ducing policies of surveillance that required statistics and 
registers, and attempting to regulate “internal” migrations.31 
Those who sought protection abroad as refugees faced not 
only the problem of their dispossession (and associated loss 
of key resources) but also vulnerability vis-à-vis organs of 
the states to which they journeyed—the latter’s police forces, 
border patrols, judicial authorities, and officials who assessed 
appeals for refuge. Those who sought security abroad were 
people upon whom the state itself practised policies of the 
kind that brought about refugee exclusions.
A key feature of the new states was the claim of central 
authorities to a monopoly of means of violence. Monarchies, 
parliaments, and assemblies wrote new legal codes, estab-
lished new judicial and penal systems, and constructed or 
substantially reformed police forces, standing armies, and 
volunteer reserves.32 At the same time ideologues of the state, 
including academics, officials, and popular writers worked 
energetically to disseminate ideas about national affiliation 
and responsibilities to those in authority. The nation was 
presented as timeless, familial (“motherland”/“fatherland”), 
and guarantor of security and integrity vis-à-vis Others. Dis-
placed people, even those formally accepted as refugees, were 
seldom placed within these accounts. Most remained out-
siders without influence on major institutions of public life.
Billig observes that Renan’s insight on the subject of for-
getting has important implications: “Once a nation is estab-
lished it depends for its existence upon a collective amnesia,” 
he suggests, adding, “The dialectic, however, is more com-
plex than Renan implied. Not only is the past forgotten, as it 
is ostensibly being recalled, but so there is a parallel forget-
ting of the present.”33 Recounting foundational myths and 
reflecting upon traditions and symbols of the nation embed 
practices “in which nationhood is mindlessly and count-
lessly flagged.”34 Here the past shapes everyday life. With 
its “banal” repetition of the discourse of nation, history 
continuously reasserts principles of inclusion and exclusion. 
The nation is projected onto Others: indeed it seeks Others 
and at the same time denies them a place in national soci-
ety. The nation is fascinated by outsiders but, to paraphrase 
Kushwant Singh, no one wishes to learn who they are or to 
understand their circumstances, experiences, and aspira-
tions: these are in fact systematically negated.
This is especially marked in nation-states to which there 
have been multiple migrations. In the case of the United 
States, argues Behdad, “amnesiac” practices are part of a 
process by which the nation has been continuously fash-
ioned as a unified imagined community.35 A rare example of 
a state in which historians have celebrated the foundational 
role of migrants (the “Pilgrim Fathers” of the seventeenth 
century), the United States has nonetheless developed and 
maintained histories of nation in which incomers have been 
systematically excluded. This amounts to a practice of “his-
torical disavowal” embedded in national culture, suggests 
Behdad.36 It has been practised in the United States vis-à-vis 
indigenous people, in relation to people of African origin 
enslaved before and after colonial rule, to Mexicans of the 
border-wars period, and to international migrants of the 
“melting pot” era of the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. It is also evident in recent border crises during 
which the state’s techniques of coercion and discipline, 
exerted against forced migrants, “enable a normalized sense 
of national identity.”37
National Liberation and Exclusion
“Nationalization” of European society in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries was driven not only by the imperative 
of achieving control over local territories and populations 
but also by competition among states, especially in the col-
onial arena. In the Americas, Asia, Africa, and the Middle 
East, European powers established states that mimicked 
those of metropolitan society—with (notionally) fixed 
borders and centralized political regimes. Colonial states 
rarely had an official history as such: they were viewed 
within the national histories of Europe as sites for pioneer-
ing deeds and civilizing missions in which colonial subjects 
were present largely as the focus of metropolitan policy. In 
the case of colonial genocides such as those perpetrated in 
the Americas, Africa, and Australasia, mainstream history 
was for generations a practice of institutional forgetting in 
which those encountered by the colonizers were marked 
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solely by their absence. In the context of “voice,” we might 
say that the silence of indigenous people in official records 
and in academic narratives was deafening.
Movements for national self-determination in the col-
onies brought a modified approach. National histories 
in new independent polities such as the United States of 
America addressed colonization and its outcomes: they did 
not, however, change practices by which those in author-
ity placed themselves centrally within the historical record, 
marginalizing or excluding others as part of the exercise 
of power. In the case of the United States, liberation from 
Britain was accompanied by a new surge of colonization to 
the south and west, and by an ideology of nation-building 
in which Native Americans, African Americans, Mexicans, 
and many others were systematically excluded. The paradox 
of nationalism, what Tom Nairn calls its “Janus-face,” was 
starkly clear:38 like European nationalisms, movements for 
liberation from colonial rule established national categor-
ies that referenced a specific past (usually based on highly 
charged myths of origin), rejected “non-national” Others, 
and developed narratives of contemporary history in which 
the latter had no place. This pattern was particularly marked 
in Latin America as independent states emerged in the in 
nineteenth century, continuing into the twentieth century 
and the post-colonial era in Africa and Asia. Here retreat of 
colonial powers was often associated with conflicts in which 
projects for independence were shaped by struggles against 
external enemies (usually the colonizers) and “internal” 
rivals emplaced by European administrations for which 
unity of the colonial state had been premised upon iden-
tification of ethno-religious, sectarian, or regional differ-
ence (the practice of divide et impera). Even in rare cases in 
which “nation-building” proceeded without major conflict 
in relation to the colonial power or local rivals, discourses of 
national unity required a heightened sense of belonging and 
readiness to participate actively in practices of exclusion. In 
the 1960s, as European powers retreated from some parts 
of Africa, the construction of Tanzania as an independent 
state was viewed as a uniquely peaceful transition from Brit-
ish rule, with limited use of state violence to repress com-
peting identities of “race,” ethnicity, and religion. Even here, 
however, notes Ronald Aminzade, “violence or the threat of 
it was an intrinsic part of the formation of the Tanzanian 
nation.”39 Tanzania’s first president, Julius Nyerere, declared 
that the key weapons required by the state were the plough 
and the gun—the latter being necessitated because Tan-
zania required “identification of those who were actual or 
potential enemies of the nation” and readiness to confront 
them.40
By the late nineteenth century most of the Global South 
had been comprehensively “nationalized.” Among the 
last regions to be affected were territories of the Ottoman 
Empire, where with the support of European powers new 
states were established in the Balkans and later in Anatolia, 
the Arab East, and the Arabian Peninsula. During the First 
World War, what remained of the empire was dissected and 
its territories distributed between the two dominant Euro-
pean powers, Britain and France. Everywhere the process 
was accompanied by mass displacement, as “non-national” 
populations were expelled, often after intense and violent 
conflict.41 It included genocidal assaults on “minority” 
populations in Anatolia during the First World War and 
ethnic cleansing in Palestine thirty years later. Each was 
associated with mass displacement that had a lasting effect 
in many states of the region.
Anatolia had been a zone of special cultural heterogen-
eity, home to people of diverse linguistic groups and ethno-
religious affiliations, including numerous Muslim, Chris-
tian, Jewish, and syncretic currents. The Turkish republic 
that came into existence in 1923 enforced new principles 
of national belonging under which those deemed insuffi-
ciently Turkish were penalized aggressively. Aktar writes of 
“homogenising the nation”—a process supported energetic-
ally by republican intellectuals.42 Keyder observes that for 
almost a century these ideologues of the new state ignored 
upheavals associated with its establishment and the fate of 
diverse communities of Ottoman Anatolia.43 “The principal 
event of the nationalist struggle was repressed in the collect-
ive memory of the [Turkish] nation,” Keyder argues; what 
remained of the multi-ethnicity of the Ottoman era was 
“silence.”44 At the same time, incoming migrants—notably 
those who moved as part of population “exchanges” with 
the independent state of Greece—were marginalized within 
Turkish society. These refugees, formally placed within a 
new national homeland, were deemed ““others,’ those who 
were not really of us.”45
In the case of Palestine, a complex multi-ethnic society 
was transformed in 1948 into an ethnocentric state. Ideo-
logues of the new Israel elaborated a highly contentious 
account of local history in which the indigenous population 
had no significant role. Palestinians were silenced by the 
impacts of mass displacement and by an ideological agenda 
that celebrated certain traditions, rights, and achievements 
embedded in the new national agenda. At the same time 
they were affected by continuous efforts of the Israeli state 
to enforce further ethnic cleansing, a process described by 
Yiftachel as “ethno-spatial domination and exclusion.”46
The dominant Zionist account of foundational events 
in Israel can be seen as a paradigmatic example of Renan’s 
contention that “deeds of violence” are excluded from the 
national narrative. Those who have challenged this record, 
notably Palestinian academics and Israel’s “revisionist” 
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historians, have often been accused of seeking to “delegitim-
ize” the Israel state—a marker of the importance of the past 
in contemporary politics.47 The Palestinian experience also 
reveals the significance of mass displacement as a functional 
practice for exclusionary regimes. Most of the Palestinians 
displaced in 1948, and their descendants to the fourth or 
even fifth generation, remain in “camps” and settlements 
in Arab states and in Israel and Israeli-occupied territories, 
while “internal” displacement (within the borders of Israel) 
continues. Exclusion of Palestinian Arabs appears to be an 
existential principle for the Zionist movement. Here, the 
violence of the “founding fathers” is revisited continuously 
upon a historic Other.
Vulnerable Migrants
In some specific contexts, forced migrants have been inte-
grated into mainstream history and play a key role in nar-
ratives of the nation. In colonial-settler states such as South 
Africa and Australia, European migrants—including trans-
portees and “exiles”—bring progressive change to regions 
perceived as backward or even “empty.”48 In both the United 
States and Israel, stories about foundational episodes in con-
struction of the state incorporate refugees. Roger Daniels 
memorably comments that the Pilgrim Fathers, religious 
dissenters from Europe allocated a key role in the settlement 
in colonial North America, have been represented as “the 
kind of people American myth-makers … liked to imagine 
we were descended from.”49 In Israel, the story of refugees 
from Europe who journeyed to Palestine (most as survivors 
of fascism and related hyper-nationalisms) is integral to 
Zionist narratives of Israel as a Jewish national homeland.
Among people displaced in the mid-twentieth century 
during Partition of colonial India, most soon disappeared 
from histories of South Asia—indeed most disappeared 
even from journalistic coverage of contemporary affairs. In 
the case of Pakistan, however, certain migrants were peri-
odically a focus of attention. Their experiences, observes 
Khan, were “woven into the fabric of national history.”50 
Judged suitable for assimilation into official accounts, they 
were identified as shuhada (“witnesses”—martyrs), “bathed 
in the language of martyrdom” as part of efforts in the new 
state to repackage Partition as “a war of liberation.”51 These 
refugees have been viewed both as victims of India’s ethnic 
separatism and, paradoxically, as agents of political change—
in this case the construction of a religiously sanctioned 
state in which key foundational episodes were facilitated 
by mass martyrdom. Here refugee voices are made to speak 
on behalf of those who shape national memory. Millions of 
non-Muslims evicted from territories that became part of 
the new state meanwhile remained invisible and silent.
The vulnerability of displaced people is a key factor in 
understanding how readily some refugees are excluded 
from or integrated into dominant narratives. This was espe-
cially clear in the Cold War era of the mid-twentieth century 
when refugees were first defined in legal terms, and move-
ments of people between East and West (viewed as political 
blocs) became a matter of ideological importance. The pres-
ence of people granted asylum who originated in states of a 
rival bloc was seen as a means of embellishing values of the 
receiving society. Tuitt comments that refugees functioned 
as “ambassadors of the Cold War period … living witnesses 
of ‘corrupt,’ ‘evil’ and ‘oppressive’ governments and to the 
‘heraldry’ of the host state.”52 In these circumstances, refu-
gees were invited to speak publicly about their experiences, 
their testimony integrated into the rhetoric of imperial 
rivalry. Carl Bon Tempo describes developments in the 
United States: “Refugee admissions struck a rhetorical blow 
against the Soviets and reminded the world of the United 
States’ unbending commitment to anticommunism and 
winning the Cold War. It is little wonder, then, that for much 
of the post–World War II era, Americans, from presidents to 
the public, associated refugees with anti-communism.”53
The willingness of state authorities to promote specific 
refugee narratives raises important questions about means 
by which refugee voices can be heard. Following the Second 
World War, the Australian government was keen to stimu-
late immigration from Europe but reluctant to admit certain 
refugees, notably Jews.54 Still pursuing a “white Australia” 
policy initiated in 1901, the authorities favoured Anglo-
Saxon or Scandinavian immigrants; as a close ally of the 
United States and of European members of the Western bloc, 
they also sought anti-Communists—among whom were 
a significant number of fascists and fascist collaborators 
from Yugoslavia and the Baltic states. Aarons notes that in 
the political climate of the Cold War and in the context of 
attempts to suppress domestic dissidence (including ban-
ning the Australian Communist Party), leading Australian 
politicians “warmly welcomed these anti-Communist refu-
gees and actively took up their causes.”55 Members of organ-
izations such as the Croatian Ustashe, known to have been 
involved in some of the worst atrocities of the Second World 
War, were readily accommodated. Some became leading 
figures in mainstream political parties in Australia, nota-
bly the Liberal Party, which governed for over two decades 
from the late 1940s, during which time it in effect amnestied 
many European migrants known to be suspected of the 
most serious war crimes.56 Certain narratives of the refugee 
experience were favoured and advanced by powerful lobbies 
within Australian society; other stories uncongenial to these 
parties and networks were dismissed or even suppressed.
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Testimony and Memory
Critical awareness of problems of exclusion and silen-
cing has led some historians, archivists, and sympathetic 
researchers to address refugees in ways that challenge 
mainstream approaches—addressing them as social actors 
whose life stories, aspirations, and ambitions are of intrinsic 
value in understanding forced migration and wider aspects 
of modern society. Over the past two decades there have 
been focused efforts to record refugee testimony through 
the practice of oral history. Paul Thompson observes that 
“oral history is as old as history itself. It was the first kind 
of history.”57 Systematic collection of oral testimony in a 
form that could be mobilized in historical texts, however, 
began only in the late nineteenth century with the work 
of cultural anthropologists in the United States. A related 
current emerged fifty years later in Britain, focused upon 
history “from below.” This introduced to the historical 
record those earlier excluded from history but who, argued 
Edward Thompson, were emphatically present in the mak-
ing of the modern social order.58 Others “hidden from 
history” were also the focus of attention, notably women 
addressed in an extensive literature produced by feminist 
historians.59 This field expanded rapidly: by the early 1990s 
Sherna Berger Gluck and Daphne Patai could reflect on “an 
enormous volume of women’s oral history, making available 
in accessible forms the words of women who had previously 
been silenced or ignored.”60 Migrants in general received 
less attention. Takaki comments that even in the late 1990s, 
Asian Americans—present in the United States for over 150 
years—were entirely overlooked.61 “They are entitled to be 
viewed as subjects,” he argued, “as men and women with 
minds, wills and voices.”62
Important advances in oral history had taken place in 
relation to survivors of the Holocaust, whose experiences 
were of special importance to those concerned with refu-
gees, memory, and “voice.” At the end of the Second World 
War, American psychologist David Boder recorded lengthy 
testimonies of survivors in Europe, then viewed as “dis-
placed persons.”63 His book of 1949, I Did Not Interview the 
Dead, is probably the first significant record of refugee testi-
mony.64 As awareness developed of fascist atrocities in Eur-
ope during the 1930s and 1940s, there were sustained efforts 
to collect testimony, with projects focused on “giving voice” 
to survivors by compiling oral records, together with collec-
tion of written memoirs, personal histories, novels, poems, 
and analysis of these texts in the context of literary studies.65 
Assessing these initiatives, James Young observed that the 
events of the Holocaust could be recorded and understood 
but must be set alongside an appreciation of how memory, 
meaning, and understanding are constructed in narrative.66 
“What is remembered of the Holocaust depends on how it 
is remembered,” he observed.67 It was not enough to “give 
voice” in the sense of merely reproducing testimony, Young 
argued, for the latter should be understood in the context 
of storytelling and recall. These insights had their influence 
on Indian scholars who had begun to reassess Partition and 
its outcomes: the historiography of the Holocaust and work 
within Holocaust studies was widely quoted in the 1990s by 
researchers investigating the Indian experience.68
“Cultural Retrieval”
Most refugees worldwide nonetheless remained outside or 
at the margins of historical enquiry. Edward Said provides 
a key explanation, observing that in the case of the Pales-
tinians the weight of a dominant national discourse—the 
Zionist account of Israel and its modern history—inhibited 
development of a “socially acceptable narrative” of the Pal-
estinian experience.69 Here, as in so many cases of displace-
ment, refugees are silenced by powerful institutions and 
ideological agendas. Ted Swedenburg also notes “the relative 
absence of any space for Palestinians to assert their narra-
tive,” arguing that this amounts to a “censorship of Palestin-
ian culture.”70 The same author draws attention to a further 
difficulty that presents special problems for those attentive 
to the refugee experience. When in the 1990s researchers 
began to collect Palestinian testimony, they encountered 
powerful narratives that claimed to authenticate the refu-
gee experience in all-embracing ways. A resistance move-
ment that from the 1960s mobilized mass support across the 
Palestinian diaspora attempted to identify and formalize a 
national history—to “articulate subaltern memories with its 
[sic] hegemonic principles to create an agreed-upon defin-
ition of what ‘the past’ was really like.”71 Here memory was 
shaped by a powerful narrative constructed “from below” 
but was also part of a specific act of collective recall. What 
was remembered of the nakba (the dispossession of 1948) 
depended on how it was remembered.
Mass displacements have often been followed by intense 
self-activity among refugee populations, mobilized around 
specific projects of national liberation or ethno-religious 
affiliation. These may have a long-term impact, with “mem-
ory” transmitted across generations and through social and 
political networks. People with no personal experience of 
displacement, flight, settlement, or resettlement integrate 
into their world view memories that derive from earlier 
generations and/or from a collective “recall” given weight by 
the influence of such movements, producing what Marianne 
Hirsch calls “postmemory.”72 This highlights a key problem 
in oral history that has recently prompted much discussion 
in narrative studies and “memory work.” Memory, like 
socio-cultural identity, is fluid. It is modified continuously 
within the contingent circumstances of individual lives, in 
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response to changing needs and in the context of complex 
relations between researcher and research participant.73 
Khalili notes the importance for contemporary Palestinian 
nationalism of discourses and acts of commemoration that 
are central to assertion of Palestinian identity and to the 
coherence of the movement.74 For almost two decades the 
Palestine Liberation Organisation, based in Jordan and then 
in Lebanon, acted as a proto-state with all the concerns of 
a state “proper,” producing commemorative publications, 
establishing monuments to martyrs and massacres, and 
declaring commemorative days and ceremonies. After the 
expulsion of the armed movement from Lebanon in 1982, 
commemorative practices changed, reflecting the differing 
approaches of factions within the movement and the efforts 
of specific groups of Palestinians to mark local histories 
and experiences by including establishment of “memory 
museums,” publication of village books, and collection of 
local oral histories. Khalili observes that ceremonial or nar-
rative forms have been “appropriated, localized and trans-
formed,” as the popularization of commemorative practice 
challenges state-based discourses.75 Butalia makes a similar 
observation in relation to India, asking about the meanings 
of “rehearsed performances” of stories told generations after 
the events upon which they focus—but also insisting upon 
the need to find space for “the small, the individual voice.”76
Conclusion: “Forgetting” the Belgians
Amnesia has a continuous productive function for the 
nation-state. In a world of states, forced migrants are by 
definition persons with attachments to other states and cul-
tures, potentially a source of threat that can be mobilized 
within discourses of national identity and social coherence. 
They are made to play a central role in national/national-
ist dramas, especially during border crises—episodes that 
dramatize issues of inclusion and exclusion—in which they 
are allocated non-speaking parts, the script being provided 
by narratives embedded in national memory. Outsiders are 
used, in effect, as a screen onto which all manner of threats 
can be projected—a practice facilitated by the predicaments 
of certain migrants, especially refugees, whose vulnerability 
means that, except in rare and specific circumstances, they 
are rendered “silent” in the face of powerful institutions and 
political actors. They have a key role in narratives of nation 
but—paradoxically—only to the extent that they remain 
mute. Forgotten by history, they are silenced in the present.
Today the accounts of forced migrants seeking sanctu-
ary in desired countries of asylum in the Global North are 
routinely viewed as fanciful or false, treated with disbelief 
and dismissed in line with policies that view uninvited 
migrants as intruders or even as enemies.77 In these cir-
cumstances refugees are rendered voiceless in the sense that 
they have few or no resources with which to address their 
circumstances: against a din of official noise amplified by 
the state itself and by mass media, they go unheard. Their 
stories, however, are matters of importance for the wider 
society. Economic change and political and ethno-religious 
conflicts associated with mass displacement often have 
feedback effects at the local or even regional level. They are 
part of the process by which states or proto-states come into 
being, by which governmental authorities attempt to assert 
legitimacy, and regimes of exclusion are established and 
maintained. As Pradip Kumar Bose observes in the case of 
India, the more that researchers probe how “the common 
people” experienced Partition, the more attention is paid to 
Partition as an active element in the life of contemporary 
society.78 Here Partition is not “as a leaf in archives, but as 
renewal, as currency, as presence.”79
National memory is a powerful influence on popular 
attitudes but also one subject to disruption and subversion. 
Histories of the nation-state give ample evidence of dif-
ficulties faced by those in authority in maintaining ideas 
about national belonging. Although migrants have often 
been used to energize such notions, they can also been seen 
as a focal point for solidarity, as popular ethics challenge 
dominant ideas about threat and exclusion. In 1914 a British 
government reluctant to accept refugees from Belgium was 
forced to come to terms with a public mood of empathy and 
support for the migrants, as both official history and popu-
lar notions about refuge, protection, and hospitality influ-
enced the public response. Cahalan notes that the Belgians’ 
plight prompted a search for means to understand their 
presence, with mainstream British history providing an 
important resource—ordinary people “delved into the past 
to place the Belgian refugees in context, and their search for 
a usable past took some back as far as the French Huguenots 
and other Protestant exiles.”80 At the same time, popular 
attitudes challenged a government not only reluctant to 
change unprecedentedly restrictive policies on asylum but 
also about to embark on mass incarceration (in the form of 
internment) of people deemed enemy aliens.81 The govern-
ment’s Belgian Refugee Committee, reporting weeks after 
the first arrivals, noted widespread public support. Recep-
tion at British ports, it recorded, “was entirely carried out 
by volunteers.”82 The committee reported, without irony, 
“The chief complaints have been from eager hosts to whom 
suitable [sic] refugees were not sent as quickly or as to the 
extent they desired.”83 As the conflict continued, at terrible 
cost in the war zone and on the domestic front, public sup-
port for the refugees ebbed and there was little resistance to 
a government campaign that by 1919 had repatriated most 
Belgian refugees. As they disappeared from British towns 
and cities, they were removed from the official record of 
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traumatic events, leaving only a trace in local archives and 
in popular memory.
At the end of the war, the British government expelled all 
manner of people deemed out of place, including thousands 
of troops earlier mobilized from the colonies.84 Borders 
were closed and immigration radically reduced as Britain, 
like other states of Europe and North America, entered an 
era of autarky. People in urgent need of refuge were once 
more rejected outright—notably Jewish refugees who only 
years before the First World War had been the main object of 
exclusions formalized by the Aliens Act. The reception and 
accommodation of the Belgians in 1914 was an inconvenient 
chapter in recent history and one that politicians and his-
torians alike preferred to ignore.
If mass displacement is part of the modern socio-polit-
ical order, so too are the experiences and memories of refu-
gees and those who empathize and solidarize with them. 
They are not only profoundly important for those affected 
but—understood in the context of their transmission and 
representation—of real significance for understanding con-
temporary realities.
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